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Abstract. Most of watermarking techniques are based on Wide Spread
Spectrum (WSS). Security of such schemes is studied here in adopting a
cryptanalysis point of view. The security is proportional to the difficulty the
opponent has to recover the secret parameters, which are, in WSS water-
marking scheme, the private carriers. Both theoretical and practical points
of view are investigated when several pieces of content are watermarked with
the same secret key. The opponent’s difficulty is measured by the amount of
data necessary to estimate accurately the private carriers, and also by the
complexity of the estimation algorithms. Actually, Blind Source Separation
algorithms really help the opponent exploiting the information leakage to
disclose the secret carriers. The article ends with experiments comparing
blind attacks to these new hacks. The main goal of the article is to warn wa-
termarkers that embedding hidden messages with the same secret key might
is a dangerous security flaws.
1 Introduction, Context and Notation
A lot of digital watermarking techniques have been designed those last years. They
mainly aim at embedding an invisible watermark into the document in a robust
manner. Several kinds of schemes have been proposed, but this article only deals
with blind robust watermarking. The reliability is usually evaluated through bench-
mark tests aiming at removing the watermark [1].
Benchmarking is not really a security evaluation, but mainly a robustness eval-
uation. In [2], Kalker defines robust watermarking as a communication channel
multiplexed into original content in a non-perceptible way, and whose “capacity [...]
degrades as a smooth function of the degradation of the marked content”, and secu-
rity as “the inability by unauthorized users to access the communication channel”
established by a robust watermark. Accessing the communication channel means to
remove, read, or write the hidden message. Hence, security deals with intentional
attacks, excluding those already encompassed in the robustness category since the
watermark is assumed to be robust.
This paper adopts a cryptanalytic approach, in the sense that the attacker first
recovers the secret that has been used for the generation of the watermark. This
approach is certainly not the only one but secret disclosure is a very powerful hack:
it gives the access of the communication channel at the lowest distortion price to
hack content. The key idea of this security analysis is that information about the
secret key might leak from the observations. Hence, the a posteriori ignorance of
the opponent decreases as he makes more and more observations. As suggested by
Diffie and Hellman [3], different contexts of attack are investigated according to the
type of observations available to the opponent.
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1. In Known Original Attack – KOA – the opponent observes No pairs of (water-
marked / original contents).
2. In Known Message Attack – KMA – the opponent has access to No (water-
marked contents / hidden messages) pairs.
3. In Watermark Only Attack – WOA – the opponent has only access to No wa-
termarked contents.
As Shannon did [4], it is worth distinguishing what can be stated as a theoretical
fact, and the practical tools making the attack really work. Hence, for each of the
above-mentioned contexts of attack, the security analysis aims at evaluating two
criteria: the security level, that is, the theoretical number of observations needed
to disclose the secret key, and the work, that is, the complexity of the algorithm
extracting information about the secret key from observations.
Such a security analysis can only be assessed for a given watermarking algorithm.
Here, we decided to focus on spread spectrum based techniques, which are widely
used for still images watermarking. Theoretical studies [5] and practical implemen-
tations [6] focus on the optimization of operational capacity-robustness functions
for a given embedding distortion.
The novelty of this paper resides in the practical implementation of the new wa-
termarking security paradigm whose theoretical background is exposed in [7]. The
algorithms we found to hack wide spread spectrum (WSS) techniques come from
the Blind Source Separation (BSS), community like Principal Component Anal-
ysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis (ICA). This use of PCA and
ICA in watermarking security analysis is new, as the only other papers mention-
ing PCA/ICA in the watermarking community have different purposes. González-
Serrano et al [8] and Bounkong et al [9] used ICA to design a watermarking embed-
der. Du et al [10] presented a technique for estimating the watermark by observing
only one image. Their purpose is the simple erasure of the whole watermark signal
and not the disclosure of the secret parameters. Our approach allows a complete
access to the watermarking communication channel to remove, read or write hidden
data3.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical discus-
sions about the measurement of the secret information leakages from the observa-
tions and the security level. Section 3 focuses on the work as the complexity of the
tools. In particular, extremely high complexity renders the attacks hardly possible.
We discuss some possible strategies to decrease the work to an acceptable amount.
In both sections, the three contexts (KOA, KMA, WOA) are investigated. Section 4
finally presents some practical results on watermarked images, where adaptation of
the tools to real signals was necessary.
2 Theoretical Results
We present a model for WSS watermarking and the methodology applied in the
rest of this section. Details in proofs are omitted but can be found in [7].
2.1 Watermarking Model
Let us denote by x a vector of Nv samples extracted from original content. The
embedding is the addition of the watermark signal, giving y = x+w. The watermark
3 We have discovered after submission a similar approach uniquely devoted to watermark
removal and only based on PCA in [11].
signal w is the modulation of Nc private carriers ui:
w =
γ√
Nc
Nc∑
k=1
a(k)uk, (1)
where γ > 0 is a small gain fixing the embedding strength and ‖uk‖ = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤
Nc. An inverse extraction function puts back the watermarked vector y into the
media to produce the watermarked piece of content.
The symbols ak represent the message to be hidden/transmitted through con-
tent. In the case of a BPSK [12], symbols a(i) take one of the following values
{−1,+1}. Note that this model also covers some side-informed watermarking tech-
niques called spread transform [13, 14], where a(k) are real values uniformly dis-
tributed in [−∆/2, ∆/2]. In all cases, the WSS aims at increasing the signal to
noise ratio by projecting signals on a smaller subspace of dimension Nc. This im-
plies that Nv > Nc. Moreover, to cancel inter-symbol interferences at the decoding
side, the carriers are two-by-two orthogonal. For security reason, they are private
and issued by a pseudo-random generator fed by the secret key.
In the sequel, the security analysis considers several watermarked vectors yj
(1 ≤ j ≤ No), with different embedded symbols aj = (aj(1) . . . aj(Nc))T being
linearly mixed by the Nv × Nc matrix U = (u1 . . .uNc). Index i denotes the ith
samples of a given signal, whereas j indices the different signals. Thus, there are No
watermarked vectors or, equivalently, with the Nv × No matrix Y = (y1 . . .yNo),
and the Nc ×No matrix A = (a1 . . .aNo):
yj = xj +
γ√
Nc
Uaj is equivalent to Y = X +
γ√
Nc
UA . (2)
2.2 Methodology
Some preliminary works have already adapted the classical guidelines of cryptanal-
ysis to watermarking [15, 16]. Their first assumption is given by the Kerckhoffs’
principle [17] stating that the encryption/watermarking algorithm is public, but
parametrized by a secret key. In watermarking, it means that the attacker knows
the extraction and inverse extraction functions. Thus, if he has access to a water-
marked piece of content, he can observe its extracted vector yj .
Now, as Shannon did in [4], we consider that several pieces of content have
been watermarked with the same key K. The opponent’s goal is to disclose K by
observing these pieces of content (i.e. their extracted vectors {yj}). Shannon named
the equivocation e(No) the entropy of K knowing No observations. It measures the
ignorance of the attacker after having observedNo pieces of content, as the following
equation holds:
e(No) = H(K) − I(K;Y), (3)
where H(K) is the entropy of K (i.e. the ignorance of the attacker before observing
any content) and I(K;Y) is the mutual information (i.e., a measure of the informa-
tion about K that leaks from signal set {yj}Noj=1). A physical interpretation readily
comes: when e(No
?) = 0, the attacker has enough observations to disclose the secret
key. The security level of the system is of No
? observations.
Does Information Leak? However, the knowledge of the carriers is sufficient to
hack a WSS watermarking scheme: these private parameters allow the decoding,
the embedding and the removal of the watermark. It is not necessary to disclose
the secret key K that fed the pseudo-random generator issuing the carriers [2].
The real issue then concerns the information leakage about w from watermarked
signal y. For instance, suppose that host signal X ∼ N (0,RX) and w is picked up
randomly among sequences distributed as N (0,RW ). Then, pY = N (0,RX +RW )
and pY |W=w = N (w,RX). This gives:
I(W ; Y ) =
1
2
log
detRX + RW
detRX
≥ 0 . (4)
This equation is extremely important as it shows that there is a leak of information
about W from Y .
Information Measurement Yet, Shannon’s definition of equivocation based on
conditional entropy, is inappropriate in the watermarking field. As we now deal with
continuous random vectors, H(W ) and H(W |{yi}Noi=1) do not measure a quantity
of information. The physical interpretation of (3) does not hold anymore. This is
the reason why we change the information measurement tools.
In statistics, Fisher was the first to introduce the measure of the amount of
information supplied by the observations about unknown parameters. In our case,
FIM (Fisher Information Matrix) is defined as:
FIM(θ) = EψψT with ψ = ∇θ log pX (Y −W(θ)). (5)
θ denotes the unknown parameter vector. In the KMA case, θ = (uT1 . . .u
T
Nc
)T ,
whereas, in the WOA context, θ = (uT1 . . .u
T
Nc
aT1 . . .a
T
No
)T .
The Cramér-Rao theorem gives a lower bound of the covariance matrix of an
unbiased estimator whenever the FIM is inversible:
R
θ̂
≥ FIM(θ)−1, (6)
where B ≥ C means that B − C is definite non-negative. Equation (6) provides
a physical interpretation: the bigger the information leakage, the more accurate
the estimation of the secret parameters. In the sequel, we will see that the trace
of FIM(θ)−1 is proportional to No
−1 if the No observations are statistically in-
dependent. We define the security level No
? by the slope of the line such that
tr(FIM(θ)−1) = No
?/No. The accuracy of the estimation of θ increases significantly
when the number of observations increases of No
?.
2.3 Security Levels
We apply in this section the methodology to the three contexts of attack.
Known Original Attack (KOA) The reader might be surprised that this context
deserves any attention. Seemingly, there is no need to attack watermarked content
when one has the original version. The pirate does not hack these contents, but his
goal is to gain information about the secret key, in order, later on, to hack different
pieces of content watermarked with the same key.
Only one carrier: In this case, the opponent has access to x and y = x + γa(1)u1.
The game is over with just one observation as a good estimation of the secret carrier
is û1 = (y −x)/‖y −x‖. However, note that it is impossible to disclose u1 up to a
sign, as the estimation depends on the sign of a(1).
Several carriers: In this case, the situation is more complicated because the knowl-
edge of w does not directly give the opponent the carriers. Indeed, he observes
several instances of dj = yj − xj = γ
∑Nc
k=1 aj(k)uk/
√
Nc. And he is interested in
guessing the Nc secret carriers uk. However, note that it is impossible to disclose
them up to a sign and a permutation of the order.
Theorem 1. The security level of WSS watermarking schemes against the Known
Original Attack is in the order of Nc pairs {(xj ,yj)}. However, this attack reveals
the secret carriers up to sign and permutation.
If the goal of the pirate is to remove the watermark signal, then, he has to
render whatever watermarked vector y orthogonal to all estimated {ûk}. If his goal
is to decode or encode without authorization, he has not enough information. The
ambiguity about the sign and order prevents him to decode the hidden symbols. Yet,
he notes whether hidden symbols change from a watermarked content to another.
Moreover, the accidental knowledge of hidden symbols in few watermarked pieces
of content may fix this ambiguity.
Known Message Attack (KMA) In this subsection, the opponent has access
to (watermarked signals/hidden messages) pairs: {yj ,aj}Noj=1. For simplicity reason,
we assume that each occurrence of random vector X is independently drawn from
N (0, σ2XINv). The following theoretical derivations can be easily adapted to colored
original signals.
The Fisher Information Matrix is, here, equal to
FIM =
γ2
Ncσ2x
AAT ⊗ INv
No→+∞−→ No
γ2σ2a
Ncσ2x
INvNc , (7)
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and IN the identity matrix of size N . The
information leakage is linear with the number of observations, and the slope is given
by the watermark to original power ratio per carrier γ2σ2a/Ncσ
2
x.
Theorem 2. The security level of WSS watermarking schemes against the Known
Message Attack is No
? = Ncσ
2
x/γ
2σ2a of {(yj ,aj)}j pairs.
Watermarked Only Attack (WOA) In this subsection, messages are unknown
so that they must be regarded as nuisance parameters. It is well-known that these
nuisance parameters usually render estimation less accurate. Moreover, constraints
must be added to the estimation problem to remove unidentifiability and singularity
of the Fisher Information Matrix. The main rationale of this presentation was used
in [18] to give an alternative expression for the bound in the case where the uncon-
strained problem is unidentifiable. We add Nc(Nc − 1)/2 constraints: the estimated
carriers must be orthonormal.
The Fisher Information Matrix is then equal to
FIM =
Noσ
2
aγ
2
Ncσ2x
(U⊥U⊥T )−1 , (8)
where U⊥ is a basis of the complementary space of Span(U). The information leakage
is linear with the number of observations, and the slope is given by the watermark
to original power ratio per carrier γ2σ2a/Ncσ
2
x.
Theorem 3. The security level of WSS watermarking schemes against the Water-
marked Only Attack is in No
? = Ncσ
2
x/γ
2σ2a watermarked vectors {yj}. However,
the secret carriers are revealed up to sign and permutation.
3 Practical Tools
The main tools come from Blind Source Separation like Principal Component Anal-
ysis and Independent Component Analysis. Their principles will be recalled when
needed, through the analysis of the three cases KOA, KMA and WOA.
3.1 Known Original Attack (KOA)
Actually, this case is related to the well known problem of signal processing called
Blind Source Separation (BSS) with no noise. A lot of papers have already been
written on BSS, and we will just recall here its goals and well-known algorithms.
The main idea of BSS is that several source signals are linearly mixed, and that
only the mixed signals are available. The goals are the reconstruction of the source
signals and the identification of the mixing matrix.
For each observation j, the source signal aj is linearly mixed by matrix U :
dj =
γ√
Nc
Uaj . (9)
This system is not unique as for whatever Nc×Nc invertible matrix P , we have dj =
γŨ ãj/
√
Nc with Ũ = UP and ãj = P−1aj . However, the mixing matrix is composed
of orthonormal vectors: UTU = INc . Thus, the system is now be determined, up to
a unitary matrix P (i.e. a rotation).
To show how the accumulation of observations reveals the carriers, denote D =
(d1 . . .dNo). A Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of vectors {dj}Noj=1 yields ρ or-
thonormal vectors lying in Span(U) (this can also be done through a SVD of DDT ,
as PCA does - see Sect. 3.3), with ρ
∆
= Rank (A). Hence, the decomposition outputs
a basis of Span(U) if the opponent has observed Nc pairs with linearly independent
symbols {aj}Ncj=1.
Once a basis of Span(U) found, the opponent can focus the attack’s noise in
this subspace to far more efficiently jam the communication, or to nullify the wa-
termarked signals projection in this subspace to remove the watermark. Yet, the
vectors of this basis are not necessarily collinear with the private carriers. This is
due to the rotation matrix P ambiguity mentioned above. The opponent cannot
decode as projection of watermarked signals onto his basis gives a mixture of the
hidden symbols as illustrated in Fig. 1. The same reason prevents him transmitting
information in the hidden channel.
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Fig. 1. PCA v.s. ICA. PCA finds the secret carriers up to a rotation, whereas ICA succeeds
to align the estimated carriers {ûk}
N̂c
k=1
with {ul}
Nc
k=1
(Here, Nc = N̂c = 2). An ambiguity
remains about their order (permutation) and their orientation (sign).
Nevertheless, under the assumption that the symbol vectors are statistically
independent, the opponent can resort to a more powerful tool: the Independent
Component Analysis (ICA). It is an extension of PCA that ‘rotates’ the basis until
the estimated symbols are independent. This happens when the estimated carriers
are collinear with the secret carriers, as illustrated in Fig. 1. For the opponent, ICA
reduces the ambiguity from the set of rotation matrices P to the one of permutations
with possible changes of sign matrices. In practice, an ICA algorithm needs No > Nc
observations to converge. A good tutorial on ICA is [19], and a welcome reference
on the links between BSS and ICA is [20].
3.2 Known Message Attack (KMA)
The Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) has been chosen because it converges
to the Cramér-Rao bound. The log-likelihood is the logarithm of the probability of
observing the data {yj}No1 knowing the model:
logL(Y) = cst− 1
2σ2x
No∑
j=1
‖yj −
γ√
Nc
Uaj)‖2 . (10)
The MLE can be defined by ∂ log L
∂uj
= 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , Nc} giving Û =
γ−1YA(AAT )−1. The complexity of this estimator is quite small. Assuming that
Nc  No < Nv, a rough approximation gives an order of O(NvNo2Nc) for the
matrix multiplications, plus O(Nc
3) for the inversion of AAT .
3.3 Watermark Only Attack (WOA)
This case is similar to BSS with noise which is really harder than the previous ones.
The covariance matrix of the observed signals is the following:
Ry = Rx +
γ2
Nc
UE{AAT }UT = σ2XINv +
σ2aγ
2
Nc
UUT . (11)
The PCA algorithm first estimates Ry by YYT , and performs its SVD decompo-
sition. A (noisy) estimation of a basis of Span(U) is given by the eigenvectors of
Ry related to the Nc biggest eigenvalues. Then, ICA rotates this basis until the
decoded symbols look-like statistically independent.
From a complexity point of view, the bottleneck is the SVD of the covariance
matrix whose size is Nv ×Nv. In practical cases, schemes spread the watermark on
very long extracted signals. This prevents the feasibility of the attack, as is.
A first idea, to make the attack work, is to split the extracted vectors in order
to process smaller vectors of size Nv
′ = Nv/p. Yet, the problem then is to put
them back together because the ambiguity about the sign and the order completely
messes the pieces. The idea shall be given up.
We design an hybrid strategy, mixing this idea of splitting with the MLE al-
gorithm used in the KMA case. The principle of the attack is resumed in Fig. 2.
When the ICA algorithm process one block, it outputs Nc estimated carrier blocks
and the estimated symbols. Taking Nv
′ as the biggest size the ICA algorithm can
manage (this depends on the available computing power), one has a chance to re-
ceive reliable hidden symbols. The pirate can now switch to the KMA context to
estimate the whole carriers at a low complexity. Thanks to the Kerkhoff’s principle,
the decoding process is public. The pirate estimates again the symbols with the
estimated carriers. It is likely that this produces a better result than the ICA on
small vectors. The iteration of the two last operations is indeed the transcription
to our case of the Expectation Maximization algorithm invented by Dempster et
al [21]. Let us summarize the algorithm:
– Initialization: ICA algorithm. Split the extracted vectors by chunks of size
Nv
′, so that the ICA algorithm works on pieces. It estimates not only pieces of
carriers but also hidden symbols Â(0).
– Iteration: EM algorithm.
• Maximization step. From the estimated symbols Â(k), the MLE algorithm
estimates the carriers: Û(k) = MLE(Y, Â(k)).
• Expectation step. The decoding algorithm gives a new estimation of the
hidden symbols: Â(k + 1) = Decoder(Y, Û(k)).
estimated carriers
?
- - MLE
decoding
6
-

initialization iterative process
watermarked
signals
estimated carriers
and messages
better estimation of the messages
splitting + ICA
Fig. 2. Final attack for the WOA case.
4 Experimental Works
This section shows experiments about the estimation of the secret carriers with
KMA and WOA, and the exploitation of this knowledge to forge pirated images.
4.1 Robust Watermarking
We have chosen a robust watermarking technique [12] embedding Nc = 8 bits in still
images of size 512×512. It spreads the watermark signal onNv = 205008 coefficients
in the wavelet domain. Wavelet coefficients are modeled as independent random
variables having their own distribution N (0, σ2Xi). The watermark amplitude factor
is proportional to this variance: γj(i) = GjσXi,j . Gj is set for each image in order
to fulfill a distortion constraint expressed by PSNR in dB (set to 38 dB in the
experiments).
4.2 Adaptation to Real Images
We need to adapt the estimators that are based on the too simple model of Sect. 2.1.
Note that normalized coefficient y′j(i) = yj(i)/σXi,j is distributed as N (Gjwj(i), 1).
The rewriting of the likelihood of Y ′ shows that yj must be weighted by Gj/1+G2j .
The opponent does not know Gj , but he estimates it with the variances σ̂Xi,j .
Algorithms are run with these weighted vectors.
4.3 Secret Carriers Estimation
We think that it is more natural for watermarkers to measure the efficiency of the
attack by a normalized correlation of estimations with the secret carriers, rather
than by a mean square error power (as the Cramér-Rao theorem would recommend).
Hence, the criteria is defined as η = tr (UT Û)/Nc. For this purpose, the estimated
carriers are normalized. Moreover, the sign and order ambiguity is automatically
removed before measuring the efficiency (we know the secret carriers during the
simulations but, of course, a pirate can not do this in real life). Fig. 3 shows the
experimental results.
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Fig. 3. Mean normalized correlation η between the estimated carriers and the secret ones
as the number of observations increases. With circles, correlations with Û(0), Û(1), and
Û(2) (see EM algorithm in Sect. 3.3). The WOA EM-algorithm is initialized with the
FastICA algorithm [22] on Nv
′ = 2048.
4.4 Hacking Content
Fifty other 512×512 images were watermarked. Two opponents try to pirate them.
They succeed if the decoded message is not equal to the hidden one (even if just
one bit is different). Pirate A uses a blind attack (i.e. pertaining to robustness).
He scales the size of the images by 1/4, compresses with JPEG at quality factor
Q, and he scales them back to the original size. Pirate B uses the following hack
(i.e. pertaining to security). He has estimated the private carriers (KMA or WOA
contexts). For each image, he estimates the hidden message and he tries to flip one
bit. The first step is to find the carrier leading to the lowest correlation in absolute
value:
k? = arg
1≤k≤Nc
min |ûTk y| . (12)
This maximizes the chance of flipping the corresponding bit at the lowest distortion.
The second step is the alteration of the corresponding bit. The attacked vector z is
formed as follows:
z(i) = y(i) −Ghack.σXi .sign(ûTk?y).ûk?(i) ∀i ∈ {1 . . .Nv} , (13)
and the inversion extraction function concludes the hack.
Three contexts have been tested: KMA with No = 100 image/message pairs
(η ∼ 0.3), WOA with No = 1000 images (η ∼ 0.5), and KMA with No = 4500
image/message pairs (η ∼ 0.9). To compare the two strategies, we measure the
probability of success (i.e. the Message Error Rate - MER) against the attack dis-
tortion between original and pirated content. For this purpose, pirate A decreases
quality factor Q of the JPEG compression and pirate B increases parameter Ghack.
Figure 4 clearly shows the power of smart attacks. They need a far smaller dis-
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Fig. 4. MER against the attack distortion - PSNR in dB.
tortion budget than the blind attack (a difference of 15 dB!). In our experiment,
pirate A’s images are so damaged that any exploitation is impossible, as illustrated
by Fig. 5. Indeed, we selected in purpose such a robust technique to better illus-
trate the danger of information leakages. Moreover, the slope of the MER/distortion
characteristics of smart attacks is very high. It means that pirate B can really trust
in his attack, whereas pirate A is never sure he succeeded until the decoding process
happens.
5 Conclusion
This article is an illustration of the recent theory about watermark security. Prac-
tical tools from the BSS community help us creating estimators for the KOA,
KMA and WOA contexts. However, a double adaptation was necessary. First, real
images require a more complex statistical model than the one used in BSS and in
the theoretical study of the security levels. Secondly, an ICA algorithm cannot be
used as is because it is too complex for such long signals. This is the reason why we
(a) Pirate A. Best quality for a
successful attack: PSNR=21.8 dB.
(b) Pirate B. Best quality for a
successful hack: PSNR=35.8 dB.
Fig. 5. Comparison between the two pirated Lena images.
develop an EM-like algorithm. However, ICA, working on small pieces of extracted
vectors, is necessary to initialize the process. Figure 4 is key fact of the paper. It
shows that a robust WSS watermarking technique might be secure iff the embedder
changes the secret key for each image. As soon as one secret key is used to water-
mark several images, there exist information leakages imperilling the security of the
watermarking primitive.
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